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Abstract 
The collapse of the Soviet system has led to the loss of social ‘safety nets’ and a 
widespread assumption that a viable alternative system will need to be based on 
western models of social policy and welfare practice. This article takes as its focus an 
example of innovative social work provision which has been developed within Russia 
itself in response to local needs. The Altai Regional Crisis Centre for Men, based in 
the city of Barnaul, Western Siberia, is unique within Russia and one of only three 
such centres in the world. In addition to providing a range of much needed services to 
local men and their families, the Centre is also actively challenging popular attitudes 
to gender. The Centre’s programme of support for single fathers and their families is 
an excellent example of both these aspects of its work. This article is based on 
interviews with the staff of the Centre, representatives of local government bodies and 
social service providers and includes a case study of men’s responses to the Centre’s 
programme based on interviews with clients.  
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Since the collapse of the Soviet system, considerable emphasis has been placed in 
both academic studies and media reporting on the loss of welfare and social 
provisions and what have been termed the ‘torn safety nets’1 of the post-Soviet era.  
Processes of change which began before the demise of the USSR have severely 
disrupted previous securities and have raised a range of social policy issues and 
concerns.  Since the early 1990s numerous studies have examined the failings of 
Soviet provision and yet have repeatedly pointed out that whatever its shortcomings 
there was at least some sort of coherent system in the past2. Much of this work has led 
to assertions that, with the Soviet system gone, no viable replacement has been 
established in the intervening decade3. This in turn, has been interpreted in some 
studies as contributing to a loss of social cohesion and damage to the social fabric, 
resulting in a generalised picture of Russian society foundering in the grips of an 
apparently interminable and ever deepening crisis4. 
A more positive picture has emerged out of research focused on the 
development of informal networks and strategies at the local level, where numerous 
examples of resilience, ingenuity and the development of innovative forms of formal 
and informal support and security have been found5.  However, it has been argued 
elsewhere that informal approaches and horizontal networks are not necessarily 
conducive to interaction with administrative bodies and policy-makers and therefore 
have little impact on the development of government-led social policy at the local, 
regional and national levels6. In making such arguments, some authors have resorted 
both to rather simplistic and perhaps overly optimistic models of policy-making and 
consultancy processes in the ‘democratic west’ and to essentialist notions about the 
‘nature’ of Russian society, questioning its capacity for progressive change and the 
sort of flexible and innovative thinking deemed crucial for the development of a 
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‘modern’ and ‘democratic’ society7. In keeping with such representations of Russia, 
the stance of many international policy making and funding bodies throughout the 
period since 1991, has appeared to be based on an assumption that this situation can 
only be rectified by the importation and implementation of western models of good 
practice8. This view of Russia has been questioned by academic researchers and 
practitioners in the field, who have called for a more culturally sensitive approach to 
the study of post-communist societies and a deeper understanding of the complex 
strategies, frameworks and approaches to dealing with problematic issues which have 
been developed locally9. As Twigg and Schecter point out, ‘while foreign assistance 
has offered a critical helping hand for many of these efforts, by and large … successes 
spring wholly from the ingenuity, sweat and community-mindedness of the Russian 
people themselves’10.  
Recent studies focusing on specific aspects of Russian social provision have 
discovered examples of excellent practice in areas such as work with long-term drug 
users11, locally based services and support for the families of children with learning 
disabilities12, or the development of programmes for homeless children13. Many of 
these examples have developed with minimal input from the west.  Whatever the 
‘bigger’ picture of under-funding, overburdening, and infrastructural decline in the 
provision of social services, healthcare and other welfare facilities to the population, 
these snapshots of positive practice also deserve attention. Indeed they must be 
recognised, not least because they pose a significant challenge to essentialist 
assumptions about Russia and its incapacity to develop progressive and innovative 
approaches and solutions to problematic issues. Whilst each local study in isolation 
may be dismissed as simply an exception which proves the rule of a deteriorating and 
disintegrating ‘norm’, the ever increasing number and variety of ‘exceptions’ suggest 
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that the ‘norm’ itself, or at least the generalistic premises on which it is based, must be 
called into question.  
This raises a particular set of dilemmas for those of us who are privileged to 
be able to engage in such research and thus to gain detailed local insight through our 
academic work. Firstly, there is a question of the broader significance and 
implications of detailed, locally-based and often issue-specific research. The findings 
of such studies frequently challenge existing theoretical stances and assumptions 
about the nature of the region or society in question. Although they focus on a wide 
variety of issues, and potentially quite different geographical and cultural contexts 
these studies often share key concepts and raise similar concerns about the imposition 
of overly prescriptive or generalistic models. There would appear therefore to be a 
need for the development of broader comparative frameworks and approaches within 
which to reflect on the meanings and significance of such local studies. Secondly, 
there is a question of audience. If such local insights and findings have a significant 
contribution to make to broader understandings of the developments taking place, 
then how do we bring this knowledge to a wider audience and in particular to those in 
a position to influence policy-making and practice? Questions such as these have been 
a matter for intense debate within certain sections of the academic community for a 
number of years, particularly amongst scholars engaging in qualitative research with a 
detailed, local focus14. Whilst this article is not able to offer a specific answer to 
either question, it does seek to contribute to this debate and to bring it to a wider 
academic audience at least. 
The case study on which this article is based, forms part of this collection of 
‘exceptional’ snapshots which, I would argue, challenge some of the premises of the 
‘bigger picture’. This is a case study of the Altai Regional Crisis Centre for Men, an 
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innovative centre working on a broad range of social welfare issues, targeted in this 
instance at supporting men.  This Crisis Centre, located in Barnaul, Western Siberia, 
offers a range of support services and access to advice and facilities for men which is 
unprecedented locally and has very few international equivalents. This case study 
therefore aims to do two things: to present an example of good practice emanating 
from Russian academic research and practical experience and to challenge some of 
the views which have become established of men’s experiences of and responses to 
post-Soviet change. 
Demographic developments in Russia since 1991 suggest that men are 
experiencing substantial difficulties as a result of Russia’s socio-economic 
transformation. Problems of alcohol and drug abuse, an abnormally high incidence of 
violent death and stress-related illness have contributed to a considerable reduction in 
male life expectancy15. The overwhelming majority of research on gender issues in 
Russia, which has been carried out during this period, including my own previous 
work, has focused on an analysis of women’s experiences of post-Soviet change16. 
The results of such studies have tended to portray a situation in which, whilst women 
strive to cope with the impacts of Russia’s ongoing transformations and to ensure the 
survival of their families, men sink ever further into a state of apathy and inertia. Men 
are seen as frequently incapable of dealing with the consequences of unemployment 
and changes in their social or economic status and are often accused of withdrawing 
from full involvement in their families’ concerns as a result. As discussed in more 
detail below, women whom I have interviewed in earlier studies have made these 
points quite explicitly when discussing the contributions men make to family life.  
Overall a picture emerges of male inability and reluctance to adapt to change. 
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However my more recent work which has focused specifically on 
investigating the ways in which men themselves describe their experiences of and 
responses to post-Soviet change has revealed a very different picture. This research is 
based upon an analysis of shifting media and social discourses about what it means to 
be a man, the impact of change upon men’s position within the family, the workplace 
and society, and men’s understandings of and responses to these developments.  
Ethnographic fieldwork has been carried out in two provincial centres: a small district 
town and its surrounding villages in Kaluga region, south-west of and bordering 
Moscow region, and the city of Barnaul in Altai region which lies beyond the Urals 
and borders Kazakhstan and Mongolia.  
 
Post-Soviet discourses on men, the family and fatherhood 
Since the collapse of the USSR there has been a significant exacerbation of problems 
pertaining to social stability and the physical health of the Russian population.  The 
effect of these on men has been most visibly reflected in the dramatic drop in male 
life-expectancy and the accompanying rise in premature deaths17.  Against this 
background, both the Russian and the western media have highlighted the negative 
repercussions of forms of behaviour, seen traditionally as male, for example, heavy 
drinking, involvement in violent crime, domestic violence and desertion of the 
family18. Within Russia there has been an increasing tendency to portray men’s 
problems as primarily self-inflicted and men themselves as the primary contributors to 
broader processes of social and demographic decline. Men are habitually portrayed as 
drunk, unreliable, selfish and these images are reflected in the ways in which women 
talk about issues related to marriage and family life. Women whom I interviewed 
during earlier research, have expressed such opinions: 
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For a woman, the husband is problem number one. There are very few 
families where the woman has a good life. For the most part either the 
husband is an alcoholic, or he is a tyrant, or a skirt chaser, or something else 
like that. 
 
Our men have stopped being men and everyone knows that. So really a man in 
the good sense of the word is a great rarity. Even if they exist they are not 
capable of being men in a family context. 19 
This is not to suggest that such forms of behaviour do not exist amongst Russian men, 
nor that they have not given rise to immense social problems and dislocation within 
Russian families.  However, as with any stereotype there is a problem around 
assumptions that such forms of behaviour are inherently male and therefore universal 
amongst the male population. 
Soviet ideologies and policies with regard to sexual equality and the 
‘emancipation of women’ never seriously challenged assumptions that men’s roles 
and concerns would ‘naturally’ be focussed almost exclusively in the public sphere. 
Indeed Soviet emphasis on production and the duties of citizens towards the nation-
state further reinforced these roles for men. From the 1970s onwards, concerns about 
the falling birth rate, particularly in predominantly Slavic and European areas of the 
USSR, prompted a re-evaluation of policies and a repackaging of the ‘emancipatory’ 
ideology. As a result new emphasis was laid on the significance and necessity of ‘sex 
role differentiation’20. This shift in state-led rhetoric and policy served only to 
strengthen persistent cultural understandings of the home and family as a 
predominantly female domain, which had survived previous more radical ideologies 
and approaches to ‘equality’.  
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With the collapse of the Soviet system in the early 1990s essentialist attitudes 
to gender and assumptions about a biologically determined or ‘natural’ division of 
male and female roles, skills and character attributes were given free reign and came 
to dominate media and public discourses virtually unchallenged21. As Russian 
sociologists Zdravomyslova and Arutiunian observe, ‘Despite 70 years of 
emancipation, there is a widely held view in Russia that men’s role in society is 
grounded in their self affirmation in their professional life, whilst for women the same 
is true of home and children’22. Simultaneously, the introduction of market capitalism 
has both placed new burdens and constraints on household budgets and provided new 
opportunities for consumption and acquisition of material wealth. The upshot of this 
has been, if anything a heightening of expectations on men to prioritise public sphere 
roles in order to provide for their families. Meanwhile, assumptions about the 
‘natural’ division of attributes and abilities between men and women, have led to a 
tendency to dismiss fatherhood, and what might be described as ‘involved’ or ‘caring’ 
fatherhood in particular, as an important part of men’s lives.  
Such is the strength of these images and their quasi-scientific basis that in 
earlier research the majority of my women respondents presented what they saw as 
men’s incapacity to care for small children as an incontrovertible, biological fact:   
Men simply aren’t capable of bringing up the children. You need patience for 
that which men simply don’t have and women are just a lot wiser. A lot wiser! 
 
I know of cases where fathers have stayed home, but it is very rare. They 
don’t know when to feed a baby, they don’t feel this. A woman feels when her 
child’s condition is changing. They know what to do. A baby is better off with 
its mother, at least to begin with.  
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Alongside this conviction that men are incapable of fulfilling nurturing and 
upbringing functions within the family there is an insistence that the proper role of a 
man is as provider. The image of what it means to be a ‘good father’ therefore is 
restricted almost solely to that of breadwinner and of being able to ensure the material 
well-being of wife and children. In the words of one female respondent: 
A man should be responsible for his family. He should be a wall, a support for 
the family and provide for its material needs. 
However, successfully fulfilling virtually the only positive role prescribed for men in 
the family is deeply problematic for a large proportion of men in the current Russian 
economic climate. As a result the ‘value’ of a man’s very presence in the family may 
be called into question. Russian scholars and specialists working in this field note a 
worrying tendency within public opinion which neglects the father’s role almost to the 
point of seeing men as necessary only for conception and thereafter as irrelevant, if 
not unnecessarily burdensome23. According to family sociologist T. Gurko, ‘The 
exclusion of fatherhood from social discourse in Russia is a plain and simple fact’24.  
The findings of the empirical research upon which this article is based suggest 
that whilst men certainly do not refute the idea that a man’s key role in the family is 
that of provider, they also do not necessarily feel that this role alone is enough, either 
for them personally or for their children. Respondent after respondent in this study 
expressed the vital importance of a deep and caring relationship with his children or 
grandchildren and several spoke out specifically against what they viewed as the 
exclusion and/or self-exculsion of men from such relations within the family.  
I also think that fathers have been a bit pushed out into second place. Just in 
terms of time, well, from what I have seen, amongst my friends, because I do 
spend time with other people and so on, I have seen that, yes the men really 
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have moved out into second place. Men are seen as like a provider of money, 
and I don’t know why, but that is all.  
Building on the evidence they have gathered over six years of intensive work with 
Russian men and, at least in part, on their own convictions, the staff of the Altai 
Regional Crisis Centre for Men have also come to the conclusion that such attitudes 
are detrimental to the well-being and personal development of men themselves, to the 
stability and contentment of their families and to the needs and desires of their 
children. 
 
The Altai Regional Crisis Centre for Men 
Within the Russian Federation, the Altai Regional Crisis Centre for Men is, at present, 
unique. The Centre is highly innovative, working with men in a variety of ways which 
are constantly evolving and expanding as the staff build on existing experience, 
feedback from clients and their families and collaborative links to similar centres 
internationally. The Centre itself is housed above a hairdressing salon, on the first 
floor of a small block of shops and offices, in a residential district to the west of 
Barnaul city centre. Despite the rather austere and desolate feel of the building 
externally, once inside the Centre the atmosphere and surroundings have been 
carefully designed to be at once friendly, welcoming and professional. An entrance 
lobby with plants, a sofa and low table is used as a reception area where staff meet 
visitors and initially assess their requirements. An open plan office area beyond the 
lobby provides both a communal working space for the Centre staff and a large area 
which can be used for group activities. Smaller rooms offer privacy for individual or 
group consultations and counselling.  
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One of the negative legacies of the Soviet system has been the continuing 
tendency to restrict public access to official buildings and institutions and to expect 
users of services to negotiate complex bureaucratic procedures.  These difficulties are 
frequently compounded by a culture of rudeness, condescension and refusal to 
respond to requests for help by those in positions of authority.  Evidence of the 
widespread nature of such attitudes and the extent of the problems they create for 
people attempting to access services or benefits to which they are entitled by law, can 
be found on the letters pages and in the advice columns of national and local 
newspapers and magazines. Some of these publications continue to describe their 
defence of the individual against these forms of bureaucratic resistance as part of their 
editorial policy25. In contrast, the accessibility of the Altai Regional Crisis Centre for 
Men, the complete lack of bureaucracy awaiting the first-time visitor, the relaxed and 
open attitude of the staff and their flexible approach to dealing with both regular and 
drop-in clients are immediately striking.  
On my second day working at the Centre I was able to witness these various 
elements of the Centre’s ethos and design in action and their impact on the staff’s 
ability to deal with clients in a crisis situation. A 76-year-old man had arrived at the 
Crisis Centre, entirely unannounced, complaining of serious and clearly traumatic 
problems with his family. Whilst a counsellor took details and offered reassurance 
and emotional support, other staff members leapt into action behind the scenes to 
attack the problem from every possible angle, drawing in local social services, 
lawyers and health care providers.  The Centre’s counsellors also began immediately 
to set up a series of counselling sessions both individually and for the family as a 
group. This occasion demonstrated the efficiency, professionalism and care with 
which staff treat a new case and their ability to do so as a team and without prior 
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notice. It was also clearly illustrative of another key element of the Crisis Centre’s 
work, one which various members of staff described to us as crucial to the Centre’s 
entire philosophy: the emphasis on a holistic approach to dealing with crisis, 
encompassing practical, emotional, psychological and social support for a client and 
his family. A key feature in the Centre’s ability to provide such support is based on 
the existence of broad collaborative networks with local social services, 
administrative bodies and other experts. For the individual client this means that a 
range of support from different agencies is entirely coordinated by the Centre itself. 
The client is not required to embark on a long, difficult and not necessarily fruitful 
obstacle race around the range of agencies in their attempt to achieve the desired 
result.  
The origins of the Crisis Centre lie in an academic interest in the situation of 
men in Altai region and research carried out at Altai State University, Department of 
Sociology, Psychology and Social Work. In 1995 this interest developed into practical 
experimentation with the establishment of a working model for a regional crisis centre 
for men. This model was developed building on co-operation between three 
institutional and interdisciplinary bases: social services; healthcare and education26. In 
February 1996 the Altai Regional Crisis Centre for Men was founded with the support 
of the Social Services Committee of the Regional Administration. The establishment 
of collaborative links with colleagues in Gothenburg, Sweden, and a study visit to a 
men’s crisis centre there served as further inspiration. Yet from its inception the 
fundamental principles on which the Centre’s development has been based have 
emphasised the necessity of sharing and adapting international experience rather than 
importing models wholesale. As the Crisis Centre’s Director, Maksim Kostenko 
explained,  
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In the development of a system of social support for men a number of factors 
must be taken into account. Some of the most important amongst these 
include: the level of resources available within the region; a locally acceptable 
combination and integration of traditional and innovative methods and forms 
of social support; the socio-economic situation in the region; the adaptation of 
foreign experience27.  
The Crisis Centre’s founders and staff have always been keen to pursue and develop 
international contacts and see no advantage to working in isolation from existing 
experience. However, they prioritise ongoing locally-based research and evaluation, 
much of which is embedded within the Centre’s projects and practice. In this way, 
although the Centre retains ongoing international links to similar projects both in 
Sweden and in Boston, Massachusetts, the model which has developed in Altai is 
uniquely adapted to the specific social and cultural context and the findings and 
working methods developed there.   
This adaptation is grounded in a deliberate policy of identifying the specific 
concerns and needs of both existing and potential user groups in the local community.  
This is achieved both through ongoing academic research and by the organisation of 
events, often in collaboration with local authorities, other social service providers and 
regionally based social organisations, designed to attract participation and feedback.  
In turn events of this kind may well produce policy recommendations and practical 
outcomes in the wider community. For example in February 2003 the Crisis Centre 
organised a round table meeting for leaders of social organisations and clubs, who are 
also fathers. This meeting was organised in co-operation with the Federal Ministry for 
Labour and Social Development, the Altai Regional Committee for Social Protection 
and a regional voluntary organisation called ‘Men’s talk’. One of the outcomes of this 
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meeting was the publication of a booklet, including a list of recommendations for 
strengthening fatherhood and family life in the region28. 
Despite functioning now as a clearly distinct and separate entity, the Centre 
continues to maintain close ties with Altai State University.  This academic slant to 
the Centre and its staff, the majority of whom are graduates of, or final year students 
at the Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, produces an approach 
which combines ongoing research with practice, continuously contributing to the 
refinement and evolution of both theoretical understandings and their practical 
applications. Each of the staff members interviewed during a research visit to the 
Centre in August 2002 described their work as a combination of research and practice. 
Several had initiated new projects within the Centre as a result of research undertaken 
during their final year of study at the University. These projects run initially on a 
temporary basis as part of the students’ final year placements, but have in several 
cases proved such a success that they have continued beyond that period, with student 
volunteers becoming paid staff members where possible. As always a major 
stumbling block to this pattern of growth is linked to funding.  Prospective staff work 
hard to secure support either from the local administration and social services or 
through applications to international funding bodies. Nonetheless, the constant influx 
of new staff and volunteers and the ideas they bring with them, facilitated in this way, 
has ensured a dynamic structure to the Centre’s work.  
The provision of counselling, psychotherapy and a holistic approach to crisis 
support is at the heart of the Centre’s philosophy, which states: 
Any person can face life crises and problems. Any person needs solid family 
and societal support to realise their potential in life. … We believe that integrity 
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and professional standards will help us to provide the best quality service to our 
client and his family29. 
Thus, the Centre’s counselling department is at the core of its work and structure and 
employs a number of fully qualified, trained and extremely committed 
psychotherapists and counsellors working a double shift from 9a.m. to 8 p.m, five 
days a week. They offer individual, couple or family sessions and work both with 
regular clients and with those seeking an initial or one-off consultation. However, as 
Russia has yet to develop a culture in which resort to counselling services is regarded 
as both positive and socially acceptable, especially for men, it is crucial that the Crisis 
Centre’s work also encompasses a thematic and project based approach, in order to 
draw in a substantial clientele. These projects ensure a broad range of activity within 
the Centre and extensive outreach to specific groups of men within the local 
community identified as particularly vulnerable or likely to benefit from the services 
the Centre is able to offer.  
At the time when this research was carried out at the Centre, eight such 
projects were in operation. These included a 24-hour telephone crisis line, a group 
helping young couples to prepare for married life, a project called ‘Men overcoming 
violence’, a programme of social and psychological support and rehabilitation for men 
who have suffered from a heart attack and a support group for adolescents with 
behavioural problems.  Finally, there is the project which forms the focus of this 
article and which will be discussed in more detail below: a programme of social work 
with and support for single fathers and their families. The Centre’s longer standing 
projects, all of which are run by full-time, permanent staff, have gained considerable 
standing and recognition locally and are supported financially by the local and 
regional administration, by working partnerships with local law enforcement and 
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social services, and through co-operation with schools, health clinics and hospitals.  
At this level the Crisis Centre sees itself as part of a deliberate local government 
policy of supporting progressive social policy initiatives both within the city and the 
region.  The programme for work with adolescents achieved national and international 
recognition and support in 2000 when, following a visit to the Centre by then Russian 
Deputy Minister for Labour and Social Development, G. N. Karelova, a successful 
recommendation for accreditation and financial support was made to UNICEF30.  
This brought the Crisis Centre and its wider programme of work to the attentio
government bodies at the federal level.  As a consequence, a number of ad hoc 
initiatives led to the Centre being provided with pieces of equipment and a second-
hand mini-bus.  However, the decentralisation of social welfare budgets in Russia 
means that cooperation with administrative structures at the local and regional level 
are likely to continue to prove more fruitful in terms of providing core funding and 
long-term support for the Centre’s initiatives. 
n of 
 
Family, Fatherhood and the Crisis Centre’s work with Single Fathers 
Whilst the Centre’s projects and work are wide-ranging and multifaceted, 
targeting a variety of groups amongst the male population, a key theme running 
through many of the projects is that of family. In part this may be attributed to the 
Centre’s philosophy, as cited above, which puts an emphasis on the importance of 
family support and on working with families as a whole. Nonetheless, even where the 
Centre’s approach or a particular project does not specifically address or relate to a 
family context the staff assert that male clients themselves raise family issues and 
look for support and help in dealing with family crises in the first instance. A good 
example of this client-led emphasis on family issues is provided by the crisis line, a 
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service designed and advertised as available to all men and without an emphasis on 
any specific set of issues or interpretations of crisis. A breakdown of the problems 
raised by callers to the line in the first three months of its existence, provided to us by 
project leader Liubov’ Skovoronskaia, indicates that the largest number of calls, up to 
41% of the total, related to family issues. Questions of love and friendship came in 
second place at 18%, whilst issues of a more general social, personal and sexual 
nature came much further down the list. 
This orientation is not one that would necessarily have been expected, 
particularly given the development of post-Soviet Russian discourses and attitudes to 
gender as described above. Nonetheless, in recognition of the concerns expressed by 
their clients as well as on the basis of their own observations, the staff of the Centre 
have developed an approach to both individual and project work which seeks to 
counter prevalent assumptions and stereotypes. The promotion of what they term 
‘responsible fatherhood’ has become a key aspect of their work, not only towards 
their male clients, but also in outreach and public awareness activities. For example, 
in 2002 the Centre organised the first citywide celebration of fathers’ day on the last 
Sunday in April. At this event leaflets, brochures and flyers explaining the term 
‘responsible fatherhood’ were distributed, family events and competitions were held 
and the local media was invited to report on the day’s proceedings. In an article 
written prior to the event, stressing its importance and calling for support from the 
local and regional authorities and co-operation with local educational institutions, 
social services, cultural, sporting and business establishments, Natalya Zhabina, head 
of the Centre’s programme for work with single-father families, wrote: 
The celebration of fathers’ day is an opportunity to encourage men to actively 
present themselves as caring and sensitive parents and not simply as 
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breadwinners. It is an opportunity to draw attention to the important 
contribution fathers can make to their children’s upbringing, not only for the 
good of the family, but for society as a whole31.  
That Zhabina heads up both the Centre’s programme of work with single-
father families and its efforts to promote a broader concept of ‘responsible 
fatherhood’ in all types of family and in the public domain more generally, is no 
coincidence. Much of the Centre’s focus on families and fathers has arisen out of her 
four-year experience of working with single fathers and their families, and as she 
explained, these men, perhaps of necessity, but frequently also by their conscious 
decision, exemplify a form of deeply involved, caring and extremely responsible 
fatherhood.  When it began, Zhabina’s work at the Crisis Centre was an entirely new 
venture in social policy provision both in Altai region and in Russia as a whole: 
At that time no-one was working with them. There was no research or 
anything. There was only a form of theoretical model and this was what I had 
to work on. So I worked a whole year, or even more, on that basis, as a 
volunteer at the Centre. … There was no-one then in Altai region, or even in 
Russia as a whole, who considered single-father families as a specific group 
of socially vulnerable families. They were just grouped together under a single 
heading of one-parent families. 
This lack of prior attention to the issue meant that Zhabina’s first task was to establish 
the size of the phenomenon and the key areas where help or support might usefully be 
offered. Working through schools, local housing authorities and benefit offices she 
began to build up a database of families where a man was raising children on his own. 
What she found was a group of much larger proportions than she had been expecting, 
over 400 families in Barnaul city alone32. An analysis of 1994 census data has shown 
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that 6% of single-parent families nationwide are headed by single fathers, however 
the Crisis Centre’s work with single fathers has also led to the view that the numbers 
of such families may be seriously underreported in statistics based primarily on the 
marital status and registered residency of parents, 
Beyond this, it should not be forgotten that there is a large number of families 
headed by fathers who are only formally still married, and who are raising 
their children alone, that is without the participation of the child’s biological 
mother33. 
For reasons which are explored in more detail below, single fathers may be 
particularly likely to persist in such ambiguous circumstances due to their fear of 
losing custody of their children if they seek to formalise their status as separated or 
divorced single parents.  
The next task facing Zhabina was to make contact with these men in Barnaul, 
to present the idea of the Crisis Centre and a programme for single fathers which 
would attract their interest and to research further into their needs and wishes for 
support. It quickly became clear that this would demand an extremely active outreach 
policy. Social services departments and local support centres reported problems 
keeping track of these families due to many fathers’ distaste for the bureaucracy and 
intrusive procedures involved in applying for benefits and a fear that excessive 
contact with the authorities or evidence of a need for support might lead to the loss of 
custody of their children. As Maxim Kostenko, Director of the Crisis Centre, 
explained, the Centre’s experience of working with other groups of men had also 
already indicated a deep-seated reluctance amongst many Russian men to seek help or 
even to accept it when offered: 
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This question of the anxiety men feel about asking for help in any given 
situation [is extremely serious]. A man will tend to look for a way out of a 
problem himself, that’s the way he will see the situation and it gives rise to a 
purely masculine reaction towards getting help – give me a couple of aspirins 
and it will all be all right – this affects all of our projects.  
In order to overcome this problem, Zhabina embarked on an intensive process 
of outreach, visiting men in their homes, distributing by hand invitations to attend an 
introductory session at the Centre, spending considerable time listening to men’s 
stories and developing a view on some of the most crucial common issues they faced. 
This is a process which continues to this day. The Centre has built up a positive 
reputation locally and a number of single fathers have now found out about it and its 
work either via local press and radio reports or through friends and relatives or other 
clients of the Centre. This is a source of immense satisfaction to Zhabina and one 
which she describes as confirming to her the usefulness and relevance of her work. 
Nonetheless, it is a gradual process and for the most part she still has to seek out 
initial contact with these men herself. 
As the testimonies of the single fathers interviewed, described in greater detail 
below, indicate, the area in which these men are most prepared to accept help is in the 
provision of practical support and information. It has been possible to help some of 
those who have ultimately refused to accept any of the other forms of support offered 
through the Centre, in this way at least. Zhabina does not seek to force these men to 
become more closely involved with the Centre and its work than they wish, but 
retains a policy of providing whatever form of help will be acceptable and in this way 
maintaining a positive relationship with the man and his family, such that the door to 
further involvement and support should remain open in future. 
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It happens really often that men don’t want to work with us. … I have one 
man with 5 children. He came to begin with. Then he started to say that he had 
no time. I tried for a while, but you can’t really push a person when they 
withdraw and say ‘No, no, I have no time’. … Well he had 5 kids. I went 
round to see them maybe 3 or 4 times. He was always washing. He was 
always cooking. … His washing machine was constantly breaking down and 
flooding water. I got onto the social services and under my influence they got 
him a new machine. They gave it to him for nothing. … He was so happy with 
it. But all the same he said, ‘I’ll manage on my own. It is really good that you 
do the work you do with us, but I don’t need anything’.  
In other cases men and their families are more receptive to the emotional and 
social support offered through the Centre and its activities and this has led to the 
development of various strands to the work of this particular project.  Her early 
contact and interviews with single fathers convinced Zhabina that many of these men 
were in need of psychological support and help to overcome the trauma of family 
break up or bereavement. In this area too she encountered a degree of resistance but 
persisted because of both the positive feedback from those men whom she was able to 
help and the frequency with which similar tales pointing to this as a crucial area for 
intervention arose: 
We thought of a model, a small programme within our programme if you like, 
to help men in a situation of acute grief. It turned out that a situation of acute 
grief could be caused by a divorce [as well as by the death of a man’s wife], or 
even without a divorce, in a situation where a woman simply left: left him for 
another man, or simply left somewhere. A man gives the impression that he is 
strong. That he can cope with everything. He carries on with life just as 
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before, but he simply stops being so attentive to the child. He stops paying 
attention to himself. He starts behaving aggressively towards those around 
him. This is something which the fathers themselves commented on.  
Finally, Zhabina applies the Centre’s holistic principle to her work, such that 
the entire family and not just the fathers are viewed as the focus of the project and its 
goal is to improve the emotional, material and social situation of a father, his children 
and any other family members, grandparents for example, closely involved with them. 
In the post-Soviet Russian context, those cases where fathers have gained single 
custody of their child(ren) are almost always where the mother has either left the 
family of her own accord, died or been found guilty of severe physical and emotional 
neglect of the child, has been convicted for drug or alcohol related crimes or has been 
diagnosed as suffering from a severe mental illness.  Over the past decade Russian 
law has been changed to emphasise the rights of the child in deciding issues of 
custody and access34.  Nonetheless, social attitudes assuming the primacy of the 
mother-child relationship have proved to be so all-pervasive that, in practice, the 
fathers of children who have actually been abandoned by their mother may still have 
to face a substantial legal battle to gain custody35.  As Maksim Kostenko observed: 
We need to say that the majority of these men are not divorced but separated, 
ie. their divorce is not legally formalised.  This is because men often lose the 
right to bring up a child so they fear starting legal proceedings because legal 
practice means that the mother will usually get the child.  
As a result many of these fathers have to contend not only with the issues 
faced by any single parent of coping with all the demands of parenting alone, but also 
frequently have to deal with children who have been seriously traumatised both before 
and during the process of divorce. The men interviewed described children with 
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nervous ticks, who found it difficult to communicate, who experienced problems at 
school or had been in trouble with the police. Whilst not pretending to be able to 
provide any ‘miracle cures’ the Crisis Centre recognises the importance for children 
from these families of spending time with others who have a similar experience and 
Zhabina organises an annual summer camp as well as a knitting circle for some of the 
girls and a new support group for the adolescent children of single fathers at the 
Centre.  As discussed in more detail below this is an aspect of the Centre’s work of 
which the fathers themselves are particularly appreciative; many find it much easier to 
accept help and support in the name of and for the good of their children than for 
themselves. Once again this stands in stark contrast to current assumptions strongly 
supported by post-Soviet gender discourses that caring, particularly for small children, 
is a feminine trait and one which men are unlikely to share. Yet, as Zhabina pointed 
out, when talking about single fathers:  
This is one of the clearest examples of responsible fatherhood.  When people 
see the way these fathers relate to their children they are amazed that men can 
be so responsible, that they can be as responsible and as efficient at running a 
home as a woman can, and at the same time remain entirely masculine. 
 
Three single fathers: a Barnaul case study 
For the purposes of this article, three of the ethnographic interviews conducted in 
Barnaul have been selected to form a case study illustrating some of the principal 
issues facing single fathers in Russia and the impact of the Crisis Centre’s services 
and support as a significant counterbalance to prevailing attitudes and assumptions.  
These three men, whom we will refer to as Andrei, Vladimir and Yuri, were all in 
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their late-thirties to early-forties and had all been single fathers for several years, two 
as a result of marital breakdown, one through bereavement. 
In the cases of both Andrei and Yuri, the children’s mothers had left the 
family when the children were very young.  In Yuri’s case, custody proved less 
problematic as his wife was facing a prison sentence. In Andrei’s case, however, the 
support of his children’s school was crucial in ensuring that he was granted custody 
and not his ex-wife who had become addicted to drugs and broken off contact with 
the children:  
We had to go through several court cases. … If it hadn’t been for the school I 
wouldn’t have done it. With our society I wouldn’t have gone through this 
process, because a mother is a mother.  
Without the school’s support, Andrei believed, it would have been impossible to 
obtain this result from the court.  Moreover, the moral support he received from the 
school’s staff undoubtedly carried him through the significant emotional stress which 
the court case brought with it: 
When there was the court case and I realised that I might even lose them and 
that for some reason they might not be given to me in custody, I was very 
worried. If I had lost that … well, I don’t know. 
It is striking, as these men tell their stories, both how engaged they are with their 
children and how unusual or unexpected they believe such expressions of father love 
to be. 
Although men who become single fathers through divorce provide the most 
graphic example of men having to fight for their right to custody, it is by no means 
taken for granted that men who are widowed will automatically either gain or retain 
full responsibility for the care of their children.  At the precise moment of finding 
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themselves in a distressing personal situation as a result of bereavement, these men 
are liable to find themselves facing at best the incomprehension or at worst the 
censure of those around them.  As Vladimir described his own experience: 
Everyone thinks that if there’s a single parent it should be a woman, that there 
aren’t any single fathers, it’s not in their nature.  I even had some neighbours, 
…  who used to say, ‘why don’t you put the children in a children’s home?’  
They couldn’t understand it, they thought a father couldn’t bring them up.   
A recent letter to Sel’skaia nov’, Russia’s most widely-read magazine aimed 
specifically at a provincial audience, echoes Vladimir’s experience.  The letter, 
published in the personal columns, tells the story of a single father who sees 
remarriage as the only way to regain custody of his children.  The manner in which he 
came to lose them provides the most revealing part of the tale: 
My wife died suddenly two years ago.  I was left with three children, two sons 
aged 10 and 7, and a daughter aged 9.  Hard as it was to cope, we managed all 
the same.  I washed, I cooked, I milked the cow … But not long ago my 
mother-in-law came and took them away saying that she could cope with them 
better, they needed a woman's care36.   
Where they take issue with attitudes such as these, single fathers such as 
Vladimir may demonstrate something akin to a siege mentality, almost a sense of 
taking on an entire society single-handed: 
At the time I said that a tragedy like this doesn’t just happen in books or in 
films and it’s come to us, but it isn’t strong enough to split us up. … I’m a 
man, I’m not giving up my children to anyone, I’ll bring them up myself.  
The sense that a loss of contact with their children could all too easily occur, and 
indeed does occur in many men’s experience, is ever-present in these interviews.   
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This issue of what is or is not deemed to be natural clearly dogs relationships 
between these men and the agencies they turn to for assistance.  By being different 
they are seen as being by definition unnatural, attempting to establish a category for 
which there is simply no provision, becoming a nuisance to well-established routines.  
Yuri’s experiences when his child became ill and required hospital treatment provide 
a classic example: 
I said, ‘look, the kid’s got a high temperature and more to the point, he’s tiny, 
he’s a tiny baby and he’s got this,’ but they just said, ‘no, you have to go to 
that hospital.  Fathers aren’t allowed to stay here, it’s all mums looking after 
the children, where are we going to put you?’   
Health care, social work agencies and much of the state’s legal framework have 
traditionally operated with the notion that mother and child provide the pivotal bond 
within the family. This can result in the exclusion of men as fathers from access to 
vital services and agencies, an exclusion moreover frequently enshrined in the very 
titles of official bodies which, like their Soviet predecessors, continue to omit men 
from their remit. For example, the key administrative body dealing with family issues 
at the federal level is entitled the Department for the Family, Women, Children, and 
Young People. Against this background, the Crisis Centre’s work appears particularly 
groundbreaking. Both in its recognition of men in a fathering role, and in its ability to 
act as a conduit between fathers and social service providers the Centre is able to 
foster increasing access and awareness. 
Nonetheless, for men who establish their right to care for their children alone, 
a mass of practical problems immediately present themselves.  The first and most 
pressing is inevitably the question of income.  Just as for single mothers, opportunities 
to earn are restricted by the need to care and family income is therefore significantly 
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depressed.  Research by staff at the Crisis Centre established that the average per 
capita income in the single father families they were dealing with in 2002 was 
between 500 and 700 roubles per month.  As Maksim Kostenko remarked, ‘it’s 
nothing’, at a time when the monthly per capita subsistence minimum set by the state 
was 1499 roubles37.   In the case of the three men featured in this case study, one was 
in receipt of invalidity benefit in the sum of 1700 roubles per month and 
supplementing this income by taking on private vehicle repair jobs, whilst the other 
two had become self-employed, one as a driver of a private hire vehicle, the other as 
an interior designer.  Their major concerns in doing this were twofold – the potential 
for working flexible hours and the provision of ready cash for their families at a time 
when formal employment in Russia was collapsing. 
In Russia, however, where the concept of self-employment is only just 
beginning to be officially recognised, working in this way has very significant 
negative implications.  People who are effectively self-employed are still normally 
viewed as not-employed and, as a result, have limited entitlement to state benefits for 
themselves.  Single fathers who have tumbled out of the state system through their 
conscious choice of employment are liable to find themselves in a kind of no-man’s-
land and, as time passes away from the employ of qualifying enterprises, inevitably 
begin to fear the long-term impact on their pension entitlement.  Of more immediate 
concern, however, is the question of health insurance.  In the muddling and chaotic 
part-privatised health care system which has emerged from the abandonment of the 
Soviet system, levels of free health care provision vary dramatically from one region 
to another38.  Yet it is an inescapable fact that throughout the country substantial areas 
of health care are now effectively privatised.  Siberian newspapers have commented 
on the fact that in the absence of a unified federal model of health care entitlement, 
 27
clinics and specialists frequently demand additional payments for consultations which 
are theoretically covered by insurance policies. This is described as a form of ‘hidden 
commercialisation’ made possible by the lack of clarity in regulations governing 
health care practice39. For self-employed single fathers on a less than buoyant income 
this may well give rise to sleepless nights: ‘You can imagine that now I’m working 
for myself I don’t have any medical insurance, so if something happens I’ll have to 
pay for everything.  It really frightens me.’   
Low income families are entitled to support from local social services and 
there is evidently concern amongst social work professionals within the city that 
families such as these do not slip through the net.  There is, however, considerable 
reluctance on the part of single fathers to seek help, as Maksim Kostenko explained: 
Men are not prepared to go and say – like a single mother where it’s written 
into the law – ‘I am a single father and I want to receive these same benefits.’  
A father doesn’t receive them because he thinks it’s beneath his dignity to go 
and fill in all these forms, have a social worker coming round and assessing 
your financial circumstances, working out your income and so on.   
If the mere act of asking is seen as demeaning, it is not surprising if becoming 
involved in the kind of bureaucratic paper chase for which Russian agencies have a 
well-deserved reputation is seen by these men as a step too far.  There is, moreover, as 
the Crisis Centre’s staff point out, an issue of pride at stake here: these are my 
children, I will provide for them.  It might be pointed out, however, that this is more 
than simply a question of pride. For men who are continually at odds with what are 
seen as acceptable male roles in Russian society, fulfilling the role of provider is a 
particularly important way in which they can preserve for themselves what they, as 
well as others around them, may see as an essentially male role. Yet in spite of this, 
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they also expressed great pride in their ability to do traditionally female domestic 
tasks – ‘I do everything.  I do the cooking and I do the washing, in fact there’s nothing 
I can’t do around the home’.   
The most significant problems, however, which these men described, were 
psychological rather than practical in nature.  The isolation which they had 
experienced as single fathers, the sense that they and their children were somehow 
running against the grain, appeared to have both underpinned and compounded the 
practical issues they were dealing with.  It was in this that the intervention of the 
Crisis Centre seemed to have been most successful.  Whilst men may be very 
reluctant to seek assistance for themselves, especially any form of counselling which 
might smack of psychological inadequacy, they are nevertheless more than ready to 
accept offers of help which can provide much-needed facilities for their children.  
Amongst a range of initiatives pioneered by the Crisis Centre both as a form of 
outreach to and a means of support for single fathers and their families, the most 
popular example is undoubtedly the summer camp for children of single father 
families.  Each year, two of the Centre’s female staff, both psychologists, sometimes 
assisted on a voluntary basis by one or two of the single fathers, take a group of 
children camping by the side of a lake renowned for its beauty, south of Barnaul 
towards the Mongolian border.   
Each day of the camp contains an intensive programme of games and activities 
aimed at helping the children to overcome isolation, become more communicative and 
talk through common problems and shared experiences. Just as significantly, the 
camp aims to provide them with an environment in which they can simply feel that, as 
the children of a single father, their experiences are normal. As Natalya Zhabina 
observed: 
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There are lots of women in this situation but for a man it’s very unusual. … 
Our groups for fathers and children, including the summer camp, play a very 
big part in [overcoming] this because the camp is just for children from single 
father families. So when they talk to each other it’s all ‘daddy this and ‘daddy 
that’, they are all speaking the same language. … They spend their whole 
lives hearing that their family is abnormal. 
Through the work of the summer camp the fathers effectively receive respite 
care, whilst their children receive a holiday which their families would almost 
certainly not be able to afford in other circumstances.  It provides an opportunity 
which is hugely appreciated by these men.  Some of the single fathers who have 
chosen to help with the summer camp may find that this has positive knock-on effects 
for them long after the camp is over.  As they get to know some of the Crisis Centre’s 
staff in a more informal way they may feel far more at ease in turning to them directly 
for help and advice: 
I went to help with this camp in Gornyi Altai.  I’ve got very friendly with the 
people who work here. … When you’ve spent something like ten days looking 
after the children there you feel more relaxed, so when I come here I feel 
freer. … It’s easy to talk to people here, I like it. 
Some of the single fathers who had not had this experience, however, also 
clearly felt able to turn to the staff of the Centre as a regular source of advice and 
support.  As Natalya Zhabina commented, men in this situation, like their children, 
are apt to feel themselves to be so abnormal that they no longer expect to meet with 
understanding: 
Men are often very touched by the concern they encounter at the Crisis Centre 
and say things like, ‘Why do you pay attention to us?  How have we deserved 
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this?’  Men who say things like this have often felt completely alone in the 
situation they are in. 
The three men in this case study each expressed substantial gratitude to the 
Centre and its staff for the opportunities offered their children and the support they 
themselves had received, echoing the remarks Natalya Zhabina had made, as in this 
characteristic comment from Andrei:   
Really, in theory, there should be some sort of encouragement or support from 
the side of society. But no, there is nothing of the kind. And I think that if 
there weren’t this Centre, I have the feeling that no-one would even look at 
me at all. Nobody even thinks about it, nobody understands it. … But the 
Centre, yes, the Centre saw me. … I am very grateful that the Centre exists. 
In each of these interviews the men underlined how positive their experience with the 
Centre had been. They described how unusual they felt this relationship to be and the 
extent to which they valued what had become an ongoing source of support. Each of 
them contrasted this with what they had come to expect from other social service 
providers and administrative bodies.  
 
Conclusion 
One of the most striking features of these interviews was the extent to which these 
single fathers saw the problems they faced as part of a broader set of issues affecting 
men as parents in Russia.  Similar concerns were raised by other men during 
fieldwork in Kaluga region as well as Altai: it is evident therefore that these issues are 
not geographically localised.  Much of the negativity which single fathers had 
encountered was, they believed, not merely about their status as single parents but the 
fact that they are men attempting to be active parents in a society which has come to 
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place an exceptionally high value on the role of mothers within the family.  In both 
Kaluga and Altai regions, men, both married and unmarried, with and without 
children of their own, were keen to talk about the question of men’s involvement in 
parenting. It would seem therefore that this is a topic of general debate which men are 
concerned about and not one that has been generated purely by the work of the Crisis 
Centre in Barnaul.  
However all-pervasive conservative views on gender may appear to be in 
Russian society, it is clear that they can be and are being challenged both on a 
personal level and institutionally. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, there is a 
growing awareness that rigid attitudes towards gender may be detrimental to men as 
well as to women. As a result, challenges to such patterns are arising from what may 
appear to be unexpected quarters, not only through overtly feminist activism, nor 
exclusively from a female perspective. As one of the single fathers involved in this 
case study observed: 
In our society it’s as if the man is a kind of stud, it’s in nature so that’s all 
there is to it.  …  This is how we are brought up from childhood, I think.  It 
doesn’t matter if we’re there or not, but the mother, the mother must always be 
there. 
Commenting on the particularly harsh realities of life as single fathers these men were 
able to make connections between their specific experiences and those which they 
shared with other fathers who are attempting to play a significant part in their 
children’s lives. Their experiences have therefore fed into the broader perspectives 
which the Centre now embraces in its programmes of work with men in the wider 
community and particularly in raising awareness locally of the importance of 
‘responsible fatherhood’. As Natalya Zhabina pointed out, this broader work on 
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fatherhood had been initiated by the interests of the single-fathers she worked with 
and their wish to bring their own ‘exceptional’ experiences to a more generalised 
family context, 
It is not that long ago that I got involved in the project for responsible 
fatherhood. In fact you could say that this was something which the men 
themselves proposed. You know when we were talking, they asked me, 
‘Natalya Sergeevna, do you do research on other fathers, those who are raising 
children with their mothers also’. And I said ‘No’. And so somehow this 
theme came back again and again and again, they became interested in it 
themselves and I got this idea about Father’s Day and I wanted to organise it. 
Really it was the single fathers who were in favour of having a Father’s Day. 
 
The Altai Regional Crisis Centre for Men is, however, much more than simply 
a campaigning body. As the examples and arguments put forward in this article have 
sought to demonstrate it is the innovative approach and the flexibility of its staff and 
programmes which make the Crisis Centre so significant as a new type of service 
provider within Russia. Its contribution is perhaps particularly marked given the 
nature of the predominant gender discourses within this society which largely dismiss 
men’s actual or potential contribution to caring roles within the family. But as an 
example of innovation within post-Soviet service provision the Centre is not entirely 
unique either locally or nationally. Indeed the Altai regional administration has 
pursued a deliberate policy of support for and development of social service initiatives 
including a range of advice and crisis centres, particularly in the city of Barnaul. The 
national picture also includes other examples of excellent and innovative practice in 
different areas of social welfare policy development and provision40.  
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Whilst the policies and models of practice developing in this way are certainly 
specific to the Russian context, the problems they address frequently are not, nor is an 
ongoing search for effective solutions.  However acute post-Soviet social problems 
have been, issues arising from male ill-health, family breakdown and post-traumatic 
stress, to name but a few, are clearly unresolved to date in the UK and many other 
countries of the world.  It might be argued that it is the very severity of these 
problems in the post-Soviet Russian context, alongside the collapse of previously 
existing safety nets, which has produced both a space for new developments and a 
willingness to support unorthodox approaches. Paradoxically, this may be more 
complicated to implement in, for example, the more controlled and structured west 
European environment.   
As a result of the support it has received locally and the successes of its work, 
the Crisis Centre has attracted interest and recognition from both federal level 
administrative bodies and international agencies. This has allowed the Centre to 
embark on a programme of expansion with the opening of several rural branches in 
2003. The possibility of replicating the Crisis Centre’s approach across other Russian 
regions is now clearly a matter for discussion. In 2004 serious plans have begun for 
the opening of a similar centre in St Petersburg supported by funds from the Swedish 
government. Initiative groups have also been established in Arkhangelsk and 
Voronezh with a view to seeking financial and local administrative support for the 
opening of such centres. In each case the experience of the Altai Crisis Centre has 
been both a source of inspiration and a preliminary model. Study visits, training 
sessions and the opportunity to gain practical work experience at the Centre in 
Barnaul are planned for the staff of the new centres. Yet adaptation to local issues, 
environments and pragmatic realities also remain paramount. Maksim Kostenko has 
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pointed out that the model developed in Altai may well have to be reviewed and 
adapted to suit the circumstances, client bases and locally pertinent issues of centres 
elsewhere in the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, the increasing interest in the 
Centre’s work which is now being shown by international agencies, such as the ILO, 
also begs the question as to whether there may be something to be learnt from the 
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